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Introduction 
The deep socio-cultural changes which occurred during the Weimar Republic 
have been obscured by the political and economic explanations as to why the government 
collapsed in 1933.  The commonly-accepted view is that the initial signing of the 
Versailles Treaty was a political mistake that doomed the fledgling Republic from the 
time of its founding.  In conjunction with the political failures, the hyperinflation of 1922 
and the Great Depression of 1929 have been the primary points which scholars have cited 
when trying to explain and understand the downfall of the democratic government.  
However, in order to fully understand and explain the violent forces that ripped the 
Republic asunder, one has to delve deeply into the fabric of the German culture and 
examine the titanic clash that occurred between German traditionalists and progressives 
during the Weimar era.
1
  
The dawn of the twentieth century shone brightly for Germany.  The various 
German kingdoms unified in 1871, having humiliated France in the Franco-Prussian War.  
The German Empire became the predominant power in middle Europe.  Otto von 
Bismarck, the first Chancellor of the Empire, set the tone for modern German Kultur, 
basing it on of the Prussian model of tradition and authority.
2
  Gone were the romantic 
German ideals of Goethe and Schiller.  They were replaced by the forward-looking, 
ambitious and, most importantly, traditionally Prussian principles embodied in 
Bismarck‟s Blut und Eisen (blood and iron) speech, given in 1862.  The land of poets and 
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thinkers, which embraced the romantic idea of a united Germany, was transformed into a 
land controlled by traditional Prussian militarism and politics.  Any progressive 
movements were dealt with swiftly and decisively by the powerful army.
3
 
During the early years of the German Empire, Otto von Bismarck used his power 
and authority to wage a cultural war, Kulturkampf, against those whom he viewed as “un-
German.”  His first target was the Catholics.4  Bismarck feared that their democratic 
elements and their social agendas posed a threat to the conservative empire that he had 
forged.  He also hoped that by attacking the Catholics, he could isolate France, which was 
a “traditional protector of the Roman Catholic church,” and in turn form a closer bond 
with Italy and Russia, which were both anti-clerical and “not on good terms with the 
Vatican.”5  Anti-Catholic laws were enacted and ministers who were Catholic were 
replaced by Protestants.  Bismarck‟s goal was to ostracize Catholics from German society 
and consequently force them to the outside.  The second phase of Bismarck‟s Kulturkamp 
was focused against the socialists.  Bismarck viewed the socialist movement as a “bearer 
of an entire Weltanschauung,” which was poised to reconstruct the whole of German 
society.
6
  The socialists faced the same persecution as the Catholics.  Both the Catholics 
and the socialists were viewed as “Reichsfeinde,” which lived “completely outside the 
pale of accepted society.”7     
 By the outbreak of the Great War, Germany had closed the gap between itself and 
the other two leading European great powers, France and Great Britain.  German 
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industrialization had caught up with and, in some areas, exceeded that of all other 
European nations.  In little over one generation German steel, energy, and chemical 
production had outstripped the continent‟s previous leader, Great Britain.8  Still, the pride 
with which the German people entered the new century seemingly was held in check by 
the dominance of both British and French culture.  To the Germans, the Great War 
represented more than a simple conflict ignited by the assassination of Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand of Austria; rather, it also embodied the right of German Kultur to survive and 
thrive in the new century.
9
  Contemporaries wrote of war as a “life-giving principle”10 
and as “the price one must pay for culture.”11  The Germans wanted to forge their own 
path to greatness but they found themselves sandwiched between the culture of Russia to 
the east and the mighty civilizations of France, Great Britain and America in the west.  In 
August 1914, war was seen not only as a fundamental component in German culture, but 
also as a necessity in order to prolong the German Empire and carry it forward to its 
rightful place in the sun. 
 Warfare held a special place in the cultures of the European powers.  Conflict was 
seen as the foundation of culture, and was used to help elevate and project a nation‟s 
culture above that of a rival.
12
  The infatuation with war reached its height in Germany.   
Peter Gay described this absurdity by commenting that “The overaged, the adolescent, 
the unfit, volunteered with pure joy, and went to death filled with their mission.”13  
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Warfare and violence were such well-grounded principles in German culture that, even 
after the Great War ended, they continued to hold great value and were materialized 
through revolution and paramilitarism.
14
  The adherence to violence created a dangerous 
and volatile political atmosphere during the Weimar Republic, which prevented the roots 
of democracy from fully developing. 
The end of the Great War brought with it dramatic changes to Europe.  The once 
mighty German Empire, which had waged war in order to push forth the idea of Deutsche 
Kultur, was physically exhausted and depleted of resources.
15
  The German army was 
still entrenched in France, having not given up any German land to the Entente, when the 
armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.  The vigor with which Germany‟s young 
men had volunteered in 1914 was still present, but had been silenced and halted.  The 
Treaty of Versailles was interpreted by many Germans as a stab in the back by their own 
government.
16
  A feeling of resentment and mistrust characterized the political 
environment of the Weimar Republic.  The nation‟s rising sun had been prematurely 
extinguished not on the battlefield, but rather in governmental chambers. 
The Weimar Republic was created in the immediate aftermath of the Great War.  
The parliamentary government was the brainchild of politicians, who were viewed as 
traitors and responsible for stabbing Germany in the back.  The Weimar era was in 
essence a second Kulturkampf, in which the socialist dominated parliamentary 
government forced liberal change in Germany against the will of the masses in order to 
push forward its progressive agenda.  As with Bismarck‟s Kulturkampf, the one that took 
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place during the Weimar era failed.  Instead of resolving itself peacefully, the democratic 
government was ripped apart.  In order accurately to account for all of the factors that led 
to the demise of the Weimar Republic, one has to look at its failure as a popular reaction 
against the German postwar society, rather than merely against the political institution 
specifically. 
 
Violence 
During the tumultuous early years of the Republic, assassinations were frequent 
and were used to express discontent over the condition in which Germany found itself 
following the Treaty of Versailles.  Those killings were carried out both by followers of 
the extreme right and of the extreme left.  Conducted primarily against politicians, the 
assassinations destabilized the already rocky Republic and cast doubts in the minds of all 
Germans over whether the democratic government could ever fully develop and thrive.
17
  
Matthias Erzberger was one of the earliest political figures of the Republic to be gunned 
down in this “Wild West” environment which came to characterize Germany during the 
months of revolution.  His assassination on August 26, 1921 was directly linked to his 
support for the Republic and his involvement in the acceptance and signing of the peace 
treaty with the allies.  He was labeled as a traitor by the Oletzkoer Zeitung, which 
commented following his death that he “suffered the fate which the vast majority of 
patriotic Germans have long desired for him.”18  Erzberger‟s was only the beginning of a 
string of political assassinations, the motives behind which were not only to destabilize 
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the fledgling republic, but also to make a statement about the course Germany had chosen 
to take following the war. 
The reaction to the assassinations reflected the general distrust and ambivalence 
that the German people felt towards the democratic government.  Politicians, who were 
honestly fighting for the people of Germany and trying to turn the country‟s misfortunes 
around, were targeted and killed with little or no reaction from the courts.
19
  The 
reactions and protests from the German people, although significant at times, were not 
widely acted upon, and paled in comparison to the power of violent political groups on 
either side of the political scale.
20
  The assassination of Walter Rathenau on June 22, 
1922 highlighted the extent to which the opposition was willing to go in order to 
undermine the Republic.  Rathenau was a highly successful businessman, and as Foreign 
Minister he helped to negotiate the favorable Treaty of Rapallo, which was signed only 
two months before his assassination.  Rathenau was Minister of Reconstruction, in which 
capacity he was responsible for successfully helping curb the rampant inflation.
21
  
Regardless of his economic successes, he was gunned down by members of the 
Organization Counsel, an ultra-nationalist group that also had been responsible for the 
earlier assassination of Erzberger.  The political assassinations of both Erzberger and 
Rathenau reveal the true intentions of the murderers.  Although both men helped to create 
a functioning and prosperous government, they were nevertheless viewed as traitors and 
threats to German society. Consequently, when the Republic was in its darkest hour, its 
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brightest political stars were murdered by extremists in the hope to facilitate a self-
induced political implosion. 
Throughout the period of 1918 to 1922 the string of assassinations was dealt with 
only lightly by the German court system.  Of the 376 total assassinations, 354 were 
linked to groups on the extreme right.
22
  Shockingly, out of those 376 assassinations only 
eighteen cases were ever even prosecuted, and of that paltry number only one was related 
to a right-wing extremist.  The judicial system of the Weimar Republic was essentially 
the same as that of the Empire – the judges who had been in place were allowed to 
maintain their positions, bringing along with them the same mindset that had been 
commonplace in German society prior to creation of the Republic.
23
  Crimes committed 
by the right were dealt with superficially if at all, whereas crimes from the left were 
prosecuted vigorously and to the fullest extent of the law, including the imposition of ten 
death sentences in the assassination cases.
24
  The court system used its power to 
prosecute as a means to persecute those regarded as posing a threat to traditional 
Wilhelmine political culture.  This bias in prosecuting political extremists reflected the 
judicial system‟s adherence to traditional customs.  Although the courts could not directly 
attack the freedom of political parties to exist, they could create an environment in which 
those who were seen as dissidents received selected punishment. 
 
Politics 
The two groups that found new voice in the political playground of the Weimar 
Republic were the extreme left and the extreme right.  The German people, who 
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previously had followed a middle-of-the-road political ideology, were forced to either 
migrate to the extremes or remain voiceless in the middle.
25
  Previously well-established 
political parties, such as the Zentrumpartei and the SPD, found that their members were 
gravitating to more radical groups.  The reality of this shift culminated in the 
parliamentary elections of 1930, in which the extreme KPD and NSDAP parties won a 
combined 184 seats, compared to only 143 by the SPD and 68 by the Center party.  This 
statistic is particularly shocking considering that, in 1928, those two parties combined 
had achieved only 66 seats, compared to the SPD‟s 153 and Center‟s 62.26  This political 
gravitation to the extremes reflected starkly the divergence in German social and cultural 
ideology. 
Due to the number of political parties that existed during the Weimar Republic, it 
was nearly impossible for one to control enough seats in parliament to hold a majority.  
Consequently, the SPD and the Center party worked together to form a coalition 
government.
27
  The “Grand Coalition” was responsible for the signing and ratification of 
the Treaty of Versailles and for many Germans executive power of parliament was too 
similar to the democratic institutions of Great Britain and France. The coalition 
symbolized the political success of the democratic institution, but also came to embody 
the defeat of the German nation in 1919.
28
  Regardless of which political party Germans 
voted for on Election Day, their ballots were symbols of support for an institution that 
they felt had stabbed them in the back.     
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In the later years of the Republic, voters began to abandon the SPD and Center 
parties in favor of the extremes, the DSNAP and to a lesser extent the KPD.  Both 
extremes, although they participated in parliament, considered the Weimar Republic a 
disaster.  The extreme right blamed the government for its role in the peace treaty and 
claimed to “undo the shackles of Versailles” if brought to power.  In the elections of 
1930, the DSNAP received 6,409,600 votes (18.3%) compared to 810,000 (2.6%) in 
1928. In contrast, the SPD lost almost 1 million votes and continued to lose support up 
until the collapse of the Republic.  By the March 5, 1933 election, the DSNAP had 
gained the support of 17 Million Germans compared to a combined 12 million votes for 
the SPD and Center party.
29
  The shift to the extreme was a materialization of the angst 
that the German people felt towards the Republic.  
The communist movement and other movements that appeared in Germany 
following the end of the Great War embodied the push to radically change the structure 
German society, which the activists claimed had been primarily responsible for the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1914.  Left-wing fighters formed groups which marched in cities 
and ran for local political positions.  They posted billboards that highlighted the power 
and potential of communism, reading “Die Flamme der Revolution darf nicht erlöschen” 
(the flame of revolution may never be extinguished).
30
  These communist groups opposed 
the Republic on the grounds that, following the war, Germany had not changed enough.  
The same capitalists and political officials who had brought Germany to the brink of 
destruction during the Great War still were in the positions of power within the 
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Republic.
31
 The problem for the KPD and other communist organizations proved to be 
not that of political institutions, but rather of German class structure itself. 
In response to the movements and advances of the political left, the right also 
developed into a violent and power lobbying group during the Weimar Republic.  They 
also fought against the new German society and, as from the left, the Republic became 
the focal point of the attacks from the right.  However, rather than their claim being that 
the Weimar Republic had not changed Germany enough, which was the rallying call of 
the left, those on the right believed that it had gone too far in creating a Germany that no 
longer embodied the Deutscher Geist (German Spirit).
32
  The right called on the people to 
throw off the shackles of Versailles and return Germany to its rightful place in the sun.  
According to Ernst Jünger, the act of destroying the Republic would help facilitate “the 
rebirth and breakthrough of the nation.”33  As seen through his commentary, the 
destruction of the democratic institution was a reflection of the right‟s goal to generate a 
new Germany.  According to Jünger, the logical way to do so was by following the same 
social and cultural standards which had elevated the country to the status of a world 
power prior to the outbreak of the Great War. 
As a result of political polarization, centrist political parties were forced to shift 
themselves to either extreme in order to remain relevant.  It was noted by one Catholic 
union laborer that “We used to argue with the Reds every day in the factory over 
religious, moral, and political questions.  Now all that has ended and we recognize 
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together only one enemy: Capitalism!"
 34
  This shift to the extremes manifested itself in 
the political ineffectiveness of the Republic.  The government, which relied on party 
coalitions to maintain a majority in the Reichstag, was unable to function efficiently 
because, as the parties drifted to either extreme, their willingness to cooperate 
diminished.
35
  The failure of the Weimar Republic was a direct result of political 
polarization, but the cause of the political polarization was not so much a reaction 
directly against the political institution as it was as an objection to the environment of the 
Weimar Republic. 
 
Violence in Politics 
Both extremes used violence to express disgust over what they felt had poisoned 
the German landscape.  The Freikorps, a paramilitary organization composed primarily 
of disillusioned war veterans, relied on strict military structure as a means to create 
stability in their lives.  Through violence and traditionalism, the members of the 
Freikorps intended to create a utopia.
36
  The group initially was hired by the government 
to combat communist unrest, but later was turned away for its brutal use of violence 
against opponents on the left.  Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, both of whom were 
prominent figures in the leftist KPD, were killed by members of the Freikorps in January, 
1919.  Sebastian Haffner commented wryly on the news saying that the both were shot 
and killed “while attempting to escape,” observing that “„shooting while attempting to 
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escape‟…became the conventional manner of dealing with political opponents.”37  
Ironically, the violent way in which social opposition was dealt with by the Freikorps 
only served further to undermine the authority and effectiveness of the Republic which it 
had purported to serve. 
The extreme left was no less violent in its dealing with opponents.  The fight to 
cause a social revolution in Germany manifested itself through political opposition.  The 
communists fought for a Germany which would be dominated by labor.  Eric Weitz 
commented that “if the republic were able to promote economic progress and provide 
avenues of political participation, at least some of these workers could be won to its 
side.”38  He went on to observe that progress and political freedom were not enough to 
win over the communists:  “From its founding, the KPD was committed to continual 
confrontation with the republic.”39  The preferred method of bringing about change in 
Germany was through violence.  Communist ideology looked towards a future free from 
the burdens of an aristocratic upper class, and it used violence to try and facilitate the 
development of that utopia.  According to Weitz, “violence came to have a political 
meaning and a certain psychological allure for Soviets as well as German Communists, 
and found its expression in the day-to-day political and cultural practices of the KPD.”40  
The government was relatively tolerant of the KPD, allowing it to protest elections and 
hold public demonstrations, but organizations such as the Freikorps and other extreme 
activists on the extreme right were not as lenient towards the left‟s seemingly unchecked 
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infiltration of German society.  Thus the extreme left was pitted against the extreme right 
in a battle to determine the future of the lost, disillusioned country. 
The ultimate triumph of the right reflected the overall German opinion towards 
the Weimar Republic and its Zeitgeist:  it was fundamentally un-German.  The reaction 
against the spirit and environment of the Weimar Republic manifested itself in the 
traditionalism of the extreme right.  In order to rectify the mistakes of the Treaty of 
Versailles and of the Weimar Republic, the German people were willing to embrace 
methods of action and thought that were familiar to them, primarily traditional Prussian 
militarism and authoritarianism.
41
  The middle-class Germans who dominated the 
political life of the Weimar Republic grew up in a traditional Wilhelmine society, which 
viewed socialism and communism as a deadly threat to civil society.
42
  The right 
propagated the fear of communism by claiming that, if it was not dealt with decisively, 
the left would lead a revolution similar to that in Russia in 1917.  The rightist DNVP used 
political posters depicting traditionally-dressed Germans and reading “Wir halten fest an 
Wort Gottes! Wählt deutschnational” (We hold firm to the word of God!  Vote German 
national), seeking to reawaken the Deutscher Geist.
43
  The extreme right‟s manipulation 
and monopolization of the Deutscher Geist and adherence to German tradition allowed it 
to topple the pillars of democratic order. The reaction against the political atmosphere in 
Germany was intensified by the anger over the radical changes that took place in Weimar 
society. 
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Culture 
Another site of contention was internationalization. While the internationalization 
that took place in Germany following the Great War was embraced by those who had felt 
constrained by the traditionalism of Wilhelmine society; at the same time the movement 
was vilified by those who felt that international influences threatened to dilute, if not 
completely eradicate, the once proud and mighty German Kultur.  The 
internationalization of Germany manifested itself through the development of the modern 
metropolis.  Berlin not only was the capital of the Weimar Republic; it also was the 
epicenter of Weimar cultural and societal experimentation.  Even though the city 
previously was the center of traditional conservative authority, after the war it was 
transformed into “the place for the ambitious, the energetic, the talented.”44  The avant-
garde artists of the Wilhelmine Germany, who had dominated the art scene and defined 
German culture prior to 1918, were replaced by young artists who wanted to change the 
notion and concept of art.  They came to Berlin in order to experience a truly 
international environment, and architects flocked to the city in order to transform the 
otherwise traditional façades into ones which would rival those in London or New York.  
The city “delighted most, terrified some, but left no one indifferent”.45  The clash 
between traditional conservatism and modern progressivism transformed Berlin into a 
battleground on which diametrically opposed parties fought for what they saw as the 
future of Germany. 
In the years following the end of the Great War, the city of Berlin radically 
changed.  The infrastructure was updated and conventional German buildings, which 
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epitomized traditional German culture, were replaced by modernist department stores and 
office buildings.  The Berlin skyline lit-up the night, as electric lights were installed 
throughout the city.  As Wietz noted, to walk the city was, above all else, “to sense 
modernity”46  New clubs opened that, unlike the beer gardens of the past, adopted world 
themes.  The Haus Vaterland was one such establishment in which patrons could enjoy 
“a Bavarian room, a Viennese room, a Rhineland terrace, an Italian room, and a French 
Bistro”47 For an even more international feel, guests could also visit the “Wild West Bar 
with its African American jazz band.”48  A contemporary commented that, in Berlin, “for 
not much money you can get a breath of the wider world.”49  Germany was no longer just 
a place only for Germans, or for that matter only for Europeans, to congregate and 
interact. 
Reaction against the alteration of the city arose from all strata, but most 
prominently from the older generations and from the political right.  Joseph Goebbels, 
who took command of the Nazi party in the city, sneered at the modern electrical 
infrastructure.  He claimed that “the confusion between night and day signified its 
degeneration”50 The conservative journalist Wilhelm Stapel referred to Berlin as the 
“cesspool of the Republic, the spoiler of all noble and healthy life.”51  The attacks against 
the city of Berlin reflected the larger discontent with the direction that Germany as a 
whole had taken after the war.  Critics of the era viewed the changes in Germany as clear 
evidence that German culture had been defeated and crushed by the victorious Entente.  
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Their goal in fighting against the metropolis, and in turn against the Republic, was to turn 
back the clock and recreate a proud and powerful Germany that would once again be able 
to challenge (and this time defeat) the old powers of Europe and spread German Kultur 
across the continent.  In conjunction with all of the superficial changes made to the 
Berlin‟s façade, there were larger and even more deeply unsettling changes going on in 
the city:  fundamental changes in the German people themselves. 
In the 1920s, women broke out into the public realm of society, energized by the 
economic potential presented to them during the Great War.  With money and time to 
spare, they began to take advantage of the new clubs and stores that were popping up all 
over major metropolises.
52
  One such store was Erich Mendelsohn‟s Columbus Haus, a 
Kaufhaus built on Potsdamer Platz.  In addition to the style of the structure clashing 
architecturally with the surrounding facades, the overall purpose and function of the 
building was new and strange to the Germans.  The Columbus House epitomized 
everything that was modern:  from its English name, to its smooth window filled exterior 
to its primarily female clientele and staff.
53
  As soldiers came home from the trenches 
they found a new type of woman; one who worked during the day and in the evening 
enjoyed the city nightlife, such as the acclaimed Vaterland, in the evening.  The 
emergence of women into the public sphere was not well accepted by all Germans, 
primarily those right of center, who believed that women should follow a more traditional 
role, namely staying at home to raise and care for the children. 
The social ideology of the right, primarily that of the Nazis, directly opposed 
women‟s new public presence and independence, and found the society which allowed 
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these new freedoms to be degenerate and fundamentally un-German.  The role of women, 
according to Nazi ideology, was to remain in the home and nurture the future of the 
German Volk:  the children.
54
  The emergence of women into the public sphere was seen 
not only as a threat to traditional German culture, but also (and more importantly) as a 
threat to the German population, which experienced a radical decrease in births after 
1914.  The statistical population pyramid, which shows that the losses from the Great 
War, the decrease in births during the war and the decline in births during the years of 
economic crises displays a rapidly dwindling German population during the 1920s.
55
   
In order to recreate the mighty German Empire, women would have to remain 
home and focus primarily on having children.  It was believed that “in a truly German 
society,… women would work and fight for the common good alongside their men.”56  
The best way for women to serve the nation was at home rearing children.  Raising 
children was not seen as a personal joy, but rather as a national duty.  Men and women 
were expected to serve the country either by fighting or by bearing children, 
respectively.
57
  A society that not only allowed, but actually facilitated, women to leave 
the home and enter the workplace, making them capable of living independently of men, 
was a society that detracted from the Deutscher Geist and consequently threatened the 
future of the nation. 
The overriding sense of freedom and independence with which women entered 
the public arena was not the only “un-German” characteristic of the Weimar era.  In 
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1919, Walter Gropius opened the Bauhaus in Weimar as an art school that pushed the 
boundaries of art and architecture.  The goal was to abandon “snobbish distinction” in 
order to facilitate “the new building of the future”.58  The traditional German architectural 
styles were replaced by clean, modernist buildings characterized by smooth facades and 
recessed widows.  Bruno Taut introduced these techniques in his design of the Onkel 
Toms housing development.
59
  The modernist buildings were a physical materialization of 
the new future that Weimar Germans were striving to create.    
The rejection of traditional artistic and architectural styles, previously promoted 
by the state, aggravated and estranged not only craftsmen but also right-wing activists, 
who feared that the new styles would strip Germany of its cultural heritage.  Traditional 
professors of architecture, such as Emil Högg, claimed that the new style represented 
“nomadic architecture” because the structures were rootless; having no grounding in any 
cultural tradition.
60
  Architecture was meant to be a physical reflection of a nation‟s 
heritage.  The fact that the Bauhaus threw away traditionalism in order to create a new 
Germany was the precise reason why so many people on the right objected to the work of 
Gropius and his colleagues.  The styles of the Bauhaus were seen on the political right as 
an affront to German culture and a threat to future of the nation.  The perceived cultural 
threat of the new architectural style, which inevitably was tied to and directly associated 
with the Weimar Republic, was so strong that, following the Nazi seizure of power in 
1933, the Bauhaus actually was shut down. 
In tandem with the new styles of architecture, other modes of art flourished and 
came to embody the spirit of the Republic: namely a push against the traditional culture 
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of Wilhelmine Germany.  The end of censorship in 1918 allowed for artists to 
uninhibitedly express themselves both on canvas and on stage.  Otto Dix drew grotesque 
scenes of brutality to characterize the horrors of the Great War and to critique the 
violence which had infiltrated German society.
61
  Cabarets, which prior to 1918 had been 
relatively reserved due to the censorship laws, exploded into mainstream German society.  
What had been light satire and slightly risqué performances became blatantly 
pornographic and grotesque in nature.  The cabaret performer‟s routine relied primarily 
on jokes concerning bodily functions and explicit detail of sexual relationships.
62
  The 
direction which art took during the Weimar era reflected the desire to create something 
new and in direct opposition to the conservative culture of the Empire.  
The excesses to which the cabarets and artists went in the effort to create a new 
German cultural heritage evoked strong opposition from critics.  The right claimed that 
the end of censorship threatened Germany by allowing insidious, “degenerate” artists to 
poison and dilute German culture with degenerate art.
63
  It was noted by one critic of the 
new direction of cabaret that “The gates to intellectual freedom had been opened, but at 
the same time the door was cast wide for all the parasites of art, who, in their businesslike 
fashion, speculated on the most lowly instincts of the mass and were not ashamed to 
prostitute art.”64  As was the case with Bauhaus architecture, artistic freedom ultimately 
was crushed by the conservative juggernaut of traditional German culture.   
Music was another mode of art which, during the Weimar era, diverged from 
traditional German customs.  Jazz music came to epitomize the internationalization of 
                                                 
61
 Weitz 328. 
62
 Alan Lareau.  “The German Cabaret Movement during the Weimar Republic” Theater Journal 43/4 
(December 1991) 478. 
63
 Gay 107. 
64
 Lareau 475. 
 22 
German society, although it was not always given the international credit that it deserved.  
It was American, and consequently modern.
65
  The bending of tones, frequent change in 
tempo, and strong lyrical rhythms were juxtaposed with the traditional military marches 
and operas that had dominated the professional musical scene of Wilhelmine Germany.  
The swinging rhythm of jazz music flourished in dance halls throughout every German 
metropolis.  The popular Berlin nightclub, the Vaterland, had a room dedicated 
exclusively to this newly-popular music form.
66
  Jazz embodied the new voice of German 
culture, and consequently came under attack by those who felt that Germany had lost its 
way in history. 
In studying the acceptance of jazz music into popular German culture, 
musicologists went to the trouble of developing their own story of how it had originated 
in continental Europe.  While paying homage to African-American influences, Theodor 
Adorno claimed that German jazz essentially was European in origin.
67
  His claim 
reflected the general understanding that Germans held regarding their adoption of jazz 
music – that jazz developed from European salon music, and therefore was rooted in the 
German cultural tradition.  As the Nazis began to consolidate their power, jazz music 
underwent a retrograde transformation.  Improvisation, syncopation, vocalized timbre, 
and instrumental breaks were all but eliminated from jazz music.  What was left was 
“only underlying substance of jazz… a substance identical to that of the military 
march.”68  Popular music no longer served the purpose of social dancing, but rather of 
propagating German militarism.  What had been a rebellious music, meant to uproot and 
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challenge traditional German culture, was manipulated and transformed by reactionaries 
to suit their desires.  Ironically, the story of jazz music “parallel[ed] the downfall of the 
Weimar Republic itself.”69 
 
Intellectuals 
The intellectual establishment of the Weimar Republic was heavily rooted in the 
conservative customs of Wilhelmine Germany.  Traditional academic institutions in 
Germany acted as harbingers of conservatism against which the proponents of the 
Weimar Republic could not fight by which they eventually were overcome.  Franz 
Neumann documented that, while he was a student at the University of Breslau, his 
economics teacher made a point of denouncing the Peace Resolution of 1917 before the 
start of his very first lecture.
70
  One year later, while he was a student in Leipzig, a 
history professor conclusively proved “that democracy was an essentially non-German 
form of political organization, suitable for the materialistic Anglo-Saxons, but 
incompatible with the idealism of the Germanic race.”71  The very institutions that were 
responsible for producing the future generations of educated Germans were at the same 
time undermining the society in which their pupils would live and work. 
The intellectual reaction against German postwar society came to be called the 
“conservative revolution.”  One such intellectual, Oswald Spengler, was extremely 
critical of the Treaty of Versailles and decisively antidemocratic.  He was a proponent of 
Social Darwinism, employing the theory to justify inequality.  Within his world view, 
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good equated to powerful and bad equated to powerless.
72
  Spengler‟s most famous work, 
The Decline of the West, became the cornerstone of the right‟s conservative thinking 
during the 1920s.  The book chronicled the rise to power and eventual demise of 
civilizations throughout history.  The defining qualities of great civilizations were power 
and national will.  All of the ones which Spengler documented attained their status 
through power, and he hoped that Germany once again could reassert itself through 
power and glory to forge a Third Reich.
73
  To do so, he hoped to shift the younger 
generation‟s notion and concept of art and poetry.  Progressive art needed to be pushed 
aside in order to rediscover the allure of technology and politics, thereby invigorating the 
spirit of Kultur.
74
  The Decline of the West was wildly popular in all strata of German 
society, including among intellectuals on both the left and the right.  Its theme, which 
symbolized the desire to return Germany to its former place of glory and underlined the 
undeniable connection between greatness and power, remained popular throughout the 
Weimar era.  
Ernst Jünger was yet another intellectual who stood opposed to the democratic 
society of the Weimar Republic.  He also considered himself to be a member of the 
“conservative revolution.”  Jünger wrote hundreds of essays that focused primarily on 
war, heroism, nationalism and sacrifice.
75
  Having fought in the Great War, his literature 
appealed to war veterans, many of whom were unable to adjust themselves to the new 
society to which they returned home.  Unlike Erich Maria Remarque in All Quiet on the 
Western Front, Jünger glorified war and the experience of living and fighting in the 
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trenches.  He remembered the experience as “an exciting and romantic contact with 
sudden danger, death, masculine energy, and exotic and elemental forces.”76  Both 
Spengler and Jünger were esteemed intellectuals who had attended German‟s best 
schools and universities and were widely read by the general public.  Their critiques 
concerning the state of German society and culture reverberated strongly throughout the 
masses, helping further to destabilize the already fragile Republic by depicting it as a 
barrier preventing Germany from returning to its former place in the sun. 
 When discussing the rhetoric and ideology of the German conservative right, it is 
easy, although generally inappropriate, to pass them off as reactionary.  Although the 
Nazis capitalized on traditional German values and practices to facilitate their rise to 
power, their ultimate goal was to create a new future for Germany.  Consequently, to call 
the Nazis reactionary is incorrect.  The Nazis were a future-oriented movement that 
sought to regenerate and resurrect the Germany that was destroyed by the Weimar 
Republic.
77
  They used modernist techniques, such as propaganda, radio, and mass 
political rallies, to help consolidate their power and influence over the German people.  
Although there was a strong emphasis and reliance on völkisch tradition, it was used not 
to “dwell on the past as a refuge from the present, but to transfuse elements of the healthy 
knowledge and values that thrived before the coming of modernity into a Germany seen 
as on the brink of total spiritual bankruptcy.”78  The Nazis and conservative intellectuals 
such as Ernst Jünger were forward-looking, in the sense that they wanted to create a new 
and powerful Germany.  To do so they adopted the rhetoric of traditional cultural ideals 
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in order to manipulate the population, by promising them a future that was already stable 
and familiar. 
 
Conclusion 
 The collapse of the Weimar Republic was multifaceted, and it is impossible to 
pinpoint one specific date or event that resulted in its ultimate failure.  The best way to 
form a meaningful understanding regarding the downfall of the Republic is to examine 
the German culture during the Weimar era.  The defeat of Germany in the Great War 
must be seen not only as a military defeat, but even more significantly as a cultural 
defeat.  What resulted from the defeat was a complete reordering of German society.  The 
Republic waged a second Kulturkampf against the traditional society of German Empire.  
The western style of parliamentary democracy was in direct opposition to the Sonderweg 
in which Germans prided themselves.  Every time the Germans voted in parliamentary 
elections, rather than rejoicing in their newfound freedoms they subconsciously were 
reminded of the defeat of their German Kultur. 
 The very freedom allotted to the Germans during the Weimar era helped to 
facilitate the untimely demise of the Republic.  During the revolution following the 
armistice, radical groups on both the left and the right formed and wove themselves into 
the fabric of the Germans‟ newly free society.  The conflict between the two groups, in 
addition to their open hostilities towards the new norms of Weimar society, created a 
perpetual state of violence in which public discourse was difficult and dangerous.  In 
addition to opposition from the political extremes, the Republic also faced passive 
opposition from the entrenched judicial system and from popular elements of the 
 27 
intellectual community, who favored a return to a traditional Wilhelmine social structure. 
They believed that German society had gone dangerously astray following the Great War, 
and regarded modernist architecture and art as being fundamentally un-German and 
epitomizing the country‟s place in the shade following its defeat in 1918. 
The prospect of crawling out of the shade and returning to their rightful place in the sun 
struck a vital cultural chord within the German masses.  The conservative intellectuals 
and right-wing activists reiterated that the only way to save the country was to turn away 
from the new German society and reinstall traditional German values.  The reaction 
against the second Kulturkampf was too great for the fledgling progressive culture.  The 
Republic as a political entity was inevitably shackled to, and as an inevitable result was 
doomed to share the same fate as, the broader society and culture which it represented.  
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